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Abstract 
Individuals have an intuitive perception of what makes a good 
coincidence. Though the sensitivity to coincidences has often 
been presented as resulting from an erroneous assessment of 
probability, it appears to be a genuine competence, based on 
non-trivial computations. The model presented here suggests 
that coincidences occur when subjects perceive complexity 
drops. Co-occurring events are, together, simpler than if 
considered separately. This model leads to a possible redefini-
tion of subjective probability. 
Keywords: coincidence; complexity; probability;  
unexpectedness; surprise. 
Coincidences  
Suicides are banal events: About thirty people commit 
suicide every day in a country like France. Yet, a French 
national newspaper, Le Figaro, reported two anonymous 
suicides in its March 20, 2004 edition, insisting on their 
similarity: Two late middle aged women who did not know 
each other walked in elegant dress into the sea and drowned, 
almost simultaneously early in the morning, just a few 
kilometers away from one another. The coincidence was so 
strange that the news was subsequently analyzed on a 
national radio. 
The famous parallel between Abraham Lincoln and John 
F. Kennedy‟s fates leaves no one indifferent, even if one 
knows that the coincidence should not be regarded as 
unlikely (Kern & Brow, 2001). Their election to Congress 
and then as president of the United States, the births of their 
successors, the births of their assassins occurred on the same 
years, one century apart. Both successors were named 
Johnson. Both assassins were themselves assassinated 
before being tried. 
Two Parisian colleagues running into each other in a 
small village close to Coban, Guatemala, perceive the 
coincidence as incredible and urge to tell the event to their 
friends. 
Studying why and how human beings are fascinated by 
coincidences constitutes an important chapter of cognitive 
science. Coincidence avoidance has definite implications for 
decision making, especially in science and in court of law. 
Moreover, people can accurately assess the strength of 
coincidences (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2001; 2007), which 
means that they are able to capture complex relations 
between events. 
The human sensitivity to coincidences is an embarrass-
ment for most current models of cognition. Some authors 
consider it as mere marginal malfunction of an otherwise 
functional general ability to assess the likelihood of events. 
The malfunction would be due to representativeness bias 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), to erroneous prior knowl-
edge (Bar-Hillel, 1980) or to failure to consider proper 
alternatives (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; Falk, 1989; 
Tversky & Kohler, 1994). Other authors see in the 
perception of coincidences a fundamental device for concept 
learning and theory formation (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 
2007). The aim of the present paper is not to settle the issue, 
although our model clearly depicts the sensitivity to 
coincidences as a genuine competence rather than as the 
result of a malfunction. Our contribution, which builds on 
recent studies on cognitive complexity, is limited to 
showing that the perception of coincidences obeys definite, 
formal laws. This mere fact, if correct, may have some 
implications for our understanding of human cognition, 
especially by shedding new light on the notion of subjective 
probability. 
Though coincidences are systematically experienced as 
improbable by subjects, their relation to probability is 
notoriously unclear: Among events of same probability, 
some may appear coincidental and others not (Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2007). For instance, children‟s attention is 
grabbed when the family car reaches 66666 km on the 
clock, but they do not care when they read 67426 km. 
People are stunned when unexpectedly meeting a friend in a 
remote place, although they are fully unable to quantify the 
probability of the event. 
Recent accounts of the human ability to assess 
coincidences split into two opposite directions. Some 
authors would consider that the basic ingredient of 
coincidences is the probability of the event (Falk, 1989) or 
of its putative causes (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007), even 
if they acknowledge the role that descriptive complexity 
may play (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2003). Some other 
studies have signaled the crucial role of descriptive 
complexity in cognitive processes (Chater, 1999; Chater & 
Vitányi, 2003) and more particularly in the perception of 
coincidences (Feldman, 2004). The former group view 
“probability as primary, and the relationship between 
randomness and complexity as a secondary consequence of 
a statistical inference” (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2003). The 
present account, in line with the second group of studies, 
puts descriptive complexity at the core of the cognitive 
competence underlying the perception of coincidences. 
In what follows, we first give a list of problems that 
cognitive models of coincidences must address. We then 
define the notion of unexpectedness as complexity drop, 
before showing that this notion nicely accounts for each of 
the listed problems, including the „encounter problem‟. We 
finally consider the compatibility of the model with tradi-
tional probabilistic accounts. 
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What Is To Be Explained 
There are required specifications that a cognitive model of 
coincidence must meet. Let us phrase them using three 
examples, the double suicide by drowning, the Lincoln-
Kennedy parallel and the fortuitous encounter. 
 
- Analogy: Each common feature between Lincoln and 
Kennedy‟s lives adds to the coincidence. In the case of the 
two drowned women, interest would have been even higher 
if they had had the same first name. If they had been of 
different ages, interest would have been lower. The repeated 
100-year interval in the two-president coincidence is an 
analogy within the analogy. 
- Association: Non-analogue features, such as the fact that 
Kennedy was shot in a car named Lincoln, still add to the 
coincidence value. 
- Prominence: Kennedy and Lincoln are among the 
foremost US presidents. The coincidence would be less 
interesting if it involved obscure US presidents, or promi-
nent Uruguayan presidents (for non-Uruguayan citizens). 
- Round numbers: The Lincoln-Kennedy coincidence 
would be slightly less interesting if it involved an 87-year 
interval. 
- Closeness: The short distance between the two suicides 
is a crucial aspect of the coincidence. In the report, 
proximity in time (early in the same morning), in space (a 
few kilometers apart) and in social hierarchy (two upper-
class women) was highlighted. Conversely, interest in the 
coincidence would drop if the distance in any of these 
dimensions was increased. 
- Remoteness: The remoteness of the place is a crucial 
ingredient of fortuitous encounters. While there is no 
coincidence in encountering a colleague two blocks away 
from workplace, running into a colleague in an obscure 
village 9000 km away from home is thrilling.  
- Egocentricity: People are much more sensitive to 
coincidences (e.g. having same birth dates) when they are 
involved (Falk, 1989). The double suicide is much more 
intriguing for people who live close to the place where the 
event took place. 
- Causality: Surprise vanishes when the coincidental 
events find a common easy causal explanation, for instance 
if the two suicidal women knew each other and had made a 
common decision. Conversely, interest is preserved when 
the available explanatory hypotheses are highly unlikely 
(Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007) as the fact, mentioned on 
the radio, that the two drowned women may have influenced 
each other through telepathy. 
 
All these parameters have systematic effects on the 
perception of coincidences. This is an indication that some 
genuine cognitive competence is at work and that the 
surprise generated by coincidences is not the mere side-
effect of a general sensitivity to the presence of statistical 
exceptions. Probabilistic or statistical accounts would fail to 
account for most of the above properties, though they may 
suggest local laws in the case of closeness and egocentricity 
(using Poisson distributions), of remoteness (using a 
diffusion model) and of explanation (using Bayesian 
networks: Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). A unified account 
is proposed now. 
Unexpectedness and Descriptive Complexity 
The core property of coincidences is that they are 
unexpected. Unexpectedness has been given various 
definitions. An obvious one corresponds to Shannon‟s 
definition of information U = log2 1/pi, where pi is the a 
priori probability of the event (Shannon, 1948). Another is 
U =  pj
2
/pi (Weaver, 1948); it accounts for the fact that 
improbable events are only interesting if they are a contrast 
to probable alternatives. Various authors have noticed the 
close relation between description complexity, also known 
as Kolmogorov complexity, and probability (Solomonoff, 
1978; 1997; Chater, 1999; Feldman, 2004). The problem 
with Solomonoff‟s definition of probability as p = 2–C, 
where C is the complexity of the event, is that simpler 
situations are assigned higher probability, as they are more 
likely to be generated. In coincidences, the reverse happens: 
Events are perceived as unlikely when they are „too‟ simple, 
for instance simpler than what the „null hypothesis‟ predicts 
(Feldman, 2004). We propose a similar idea, captured in the 
following definition of unexpectedness. 
 U(D) = Cw(D) – C(D) (1) 
As observed by Tversky and Koehler (1994), “probability 
judgments are attached not to events but to descriptions of 
events”. The unexpectedness of an event described through 
D is the difference between its W-complexity, or complex-
ity „in the world‟ (as it is understood by the subject) and its 
observational complexity or O-complexity. Both Cw and C 
are cognitive: They correspond to minimal cognitive 
descriptions available to the individual (Chater, 1999). They 
express the length of minimal „programs‟ given to two 
different „machines‟ that may be dubbed W-machine and O-
machine. The W-machine functions according to what the 
subject sees as the normal behavior of the world (the W-
machine, therefore, depends on the subject‟s knowledge). 
The O-machine is unconstrained and may use any 
observational ability available to the subject. Cw and C are 
the minimal amounts of instructions, in bits, that must be 
given as input to these machines to generate the event 
described by D. These definitions are consistent with the 
original definition of Kolmogorov complexity, except that 
the ideal Turing machine is replaced by two versions of the 
human cognitive analysis capabilities. 
Consider the coincidence of seeing 66666 on the clock 
when driving. The W-machine generates this pattern by 
copying an uninstantiated digit and then by performing five 
independent instantiations. The W-complexity thus amounts 
to Cw = Ccopy + 5log2 10 (as the complexity of designating 
one number chosen among n is log2 n). The O-machine 
generates the same pattern by copying an instantiated digit: 
C = log2 10 + Ccopy. We thus get: U = 4log2 10 = 13.3 bit. 
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According to definition (1), merely mentioning „John F. 
Kennedy‟ creates a negative unexpectedness. The world (as 
the subject knows it) is supposed to be available to the W-
machine; therefore, the W-complexity of „John F. Kennedy‟ 
is zero, as he is believed to have existed. The O-machine 
requires a non-zero input to determine „John F. Kennedy‟. A 
minimal cognitive description may use a list of famous 
characters ranked by celebrity. The O-complexity would be 
the logarithm of Kennedy‟s rank in that list. Alternatively 
(especially for people outside the US), a minimal 
description may go through the mention of the notion of US 
presidency, and then through the determination of John 
Kennedy among US presidents. O-complexity here is 
related to cognitive availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973) and may be independently assessed by various means 
including reaction times.  
The mere mention of a feature like Kennedy‟s age by the 
time he was killed requires no work from the W-machine, as 
everyone has an age; but its instantiation to a definite value 
such as 46 involves some complexity. In the worst case, the 
W-machine generates that age by copying it from its input. 
However, the W-machine may determine the age by 
choosing among likely age values for a US president, which 
leads to a lower complexity. 
Unexpectedness and Coincidences 
Let us show now how the notion of unexpectedness can 
account for the eight specifications previously listed. We 
need the notion of computation sequence, noted with 
operator *. The sequence D1*D2 means that the W-machine 
needs to generate D1 before generating D2: 
 Cw(D1*D2) = Cw(D1) + Cw(D2|D1)  (2) 
In a coincidence like the double suicide, the two events e1 
and e2 are independent for the W-machine: Cw(e2|e1) = 
Cw(e2). We get: 
 U(e1*e2) > Cw(e1) + Cw(e2) – C(e1) – C(e2|e1)  (3) 
The inequality comes from the fact that the computation 
sequence may be suboptimal for the O-machine. We can 
now review the eight specifications. 
 
Analogy: This formula correctly predicts the importance 
of a close analogy between the two events, as best analogies 
make C(e1) + C(e2|e1) minimum (Cornuéjols, 1996). Each 
new common element, such as the birth date of the assassins 
in the Lincoln-Kennedy parallel, is needed twice for the W-
machine, but only once for the O-machine, as its contribu-
tion to C(e2|e1) is zero. Common elements thus add to the 
unexpectedness of the situation. An additional prediction is 
that more complex common elements will be more surpris-
ing. Interest would indeed grow if the two drowned women 
wore a tattoo, but even more so if both had a red five-
centimeter long tattoo on the right shoulder.  
 
Association: Inequation (3) predicts that any element of e1 
that the O-machine can reuse to generate e2 will add to the 
surprise. Hence the mention that Kennedy was killed in car 
named Lincoln. The W-machine must generate the make of 
the car and requires several bits which add to Cw(e2) to 
distinguish it from other makes; this generation is easier for 
the O-machine when e1 is given as input, as the name 
„Lincoln‟ is available for free. 
 
Prominence: Why is it important that Abraham Lincoln 
and John F. Kennedy be famous? Formula (3) provides an 
answer. These two persons exist and are unique in the 
subject‟s world; the W-machine has thus no work to do to 
generate them. For the O-machine, however, their minimal 
description may go through determining their social role, 
US president, and then find them in a ranked list of US-
presidents. Hence the importance for the coincidence to 
involve two prominent figures, as their complexity, which 
amounts to the logarithm of their rank in a list ordered by 
celebrity, adds to C(e1) and to C(e2|e1). Similarly, a social 
role such as president of Uruguay, if more complex for the 
subject, makes the coincidence less surprising, as it adds 
significantly to C(e1). 
 
Round numbers: The presence of the negative term 
-- C(e2|e1) in (3) explains why the Lincoln-Kennedy story is 
more interesting as it is than if the repeated time interval 
had been of 87 years instead of 100. The point is that the 
cognitive complexity of the program that transforms 1846 
into 1946 or 1860 into 1960 is simpler than the program that 
would transform 1846 into 1933 and 1860 into 1947 (the 
first program affects only one digit). Alternatively, one can 
observe that 100, as a number, is simpler than 87. The 
complexity of an integer n is smaller than log2 n. In the case 
of round numbers, it is significantly smaller. One million 
may be concisely defined as 10
6
, or as 1 followed by six 
copies of 0. 
 
Closeness: The role of closeness in time and space, as in 
the example of the double suicide, can only be understood if 
the notion of complexity is extended to continuous 
quantities. Though Kolmogorov complexity is defined only 
for discrete structures, the complexity of a place is naturally 
defined as the most concise set of directions that allows 
finding it. Locating a surface a
2
 on a two-dimensional area S 
requires no more than log2 (S/a
2
) bits. When trying to locate 
such an area B from a place A, one may use a relative code, 
in which locations are ranked according to their distance 
from A. In such a system, the complexity of B amounts to 
C(B|A) = log2 (d
2
/a
2
), where d is the distance from A to B. 
This complexity varies as 2log2 d. In expression (3), the 
W-machine must compute the location of each event 
independently. The O-machine computes the location of one 
event, and then may use a relative coding. Hence the crucial 
importance of the two events being close to each other, as 
C(e2|e1) involves a term 2log2 d. The same prediction holds 
for the time dimension: Surprisingness decreases as log2 t 
where t is the time interval between the two events. 
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Proximity effects do not require the presence of two 
events. On July 22, 2003, a minor blaze on the upper floor 
of the Eiffel Tower was reported in French national news 
media. This phenomenon is explained by formula (1). The 
W-machine must generate the location of the blaze. If fires 
occur with a spatial density D, then localizing one of them 
demands log2 1/(a
2
D) bits, as 1/D represents the area of 
occurrence of one such event on average. The O-machine 
has first to specify the location of the Eiffel Tower, but this 
requires minimum complexity as the place is prominent (it 
is the top most popular monument in France). Then the O-
machine gets the location of the blaze for free. The 
coincidence effect is predicted to decrease as the logarithm 
of the spatial density of the event and proportionally to the 
complexity of the monument. No wonder that events 
happening on prominent places are preferentially reported in 
the news (Warren, 1934). 
 
Remoteness: Fortuitous encounters seem to be an 
exception to the rule of closeness, as the interest of the 
coincidence grows this time with the remoteness of the 
place! A proper application of (3), however, restores the 
prediction. 
First, let us observe that the encounter problem is spec-
tacular, as it provides the best evidence that the human mind 
is sensitive to description complexity. In this kind of coinci-
dence, interest grows with the complexity of the place and 
with the simplicity of the encountered person. The com-
plexity of the place l is the relevant factor, not the distance: 
a big distant airport may be less complex than the backyard 
of an obscure building of a lost suburb a few kilometers 
away. The simplicity of the encountered person P is the 
relevant factor, not her closeness. Running into a celebrity 
may be as unexpected as running into a close colleague. 
These phenomenon is correctly predicted by the fact that 
unexpectedness varies as C(l) – C(P), as we show now. 
Let us compute
1
 the unexpectedness of the sequence 
ego*P*l(ego)*l(P). Here, l(ego) and l(P) designate the 
presence of self and of P at location l. For the W-machine, 
Cw(P) = 0 as P is supposed to exist. In the „world‟, P‟s and 
ego’s presence at l are independent: Cw(l(P)|l(ego)) = 
Cw(l(P)). If ego and P play symmetrical roles, the W-
machine requires Cw(ego*P*l(ego)*l(P)) = 2 Cw(l(ego)) to 
generate the encounter situation. The term Cw(l(ego)) 
corresponds to the minimum size of a set of directions to 
reach l and amounts to C(l) in most cases (except if l is 
materially difficult to reach). On the other hand, for the O-
machine, C(l(P)|l(ego)) is zero. The O-machine demands 
C(P) to determine P and C(l(ego)) to bring ego to l. Again, 
we suppose that C(l(ego)) = C(l). We get, as announced: 
 U(ego*P*l(ego)*l(P)) > C(l) – C(P)  (4) 
                                                          
1 A recursive application of formula (2) gives Cw(D1*D2*D3) = 
Cw(D1) + Cw(D2|D1) + Cw(D3|D1&D2). Irrelevant elements in 
conditional complexity expressions are omitted for the sake of 
clarity. 
An alternative computation goes over the sequence 
ego*l(ego)*l(P)*P. This time, P is first determined by her 
position l(P) = l(ego). Now Cw(l(P)|l(ego)) is zero, but not 
Cw(P|l(P)). To instantiate P, the W-machine has to 
distinguish among all individuals that may happen to be in l. 
One procedure to do so consists in checking local people 
first, by delimiting an area of radius R around l and 
considering all people living within it. Then R is increased 
until the actual P is reached. In this computation, l and P‟s 
home play symmetrical roles, so that Cw(P|l(P)) = C(l) + c 
(again, l is supposed to be as complex for P as for ego). The 
constant c depends on the spatial density of people. The 
resulting unexpectedness C(l) + c – C(P) is similar to what 
we obtained in (4). Note that this second computation still 
holds when the encounter occurs in the vicinity of ego‟s 
home. In this case, Cw(l(ego)) and C(l(ego)) are negligible, 
but Cw(l(P)) is close to C(h(P)) (the complexity of P‟s 
home) and the unexpectedness amounts to C(h(P)) + c – 
C(P). It is indeed quite a coincidence to meet a celebrity in 
front of one‟s home. 
 
Egocentricity: In the case of fortuitous encounters as for 
happening to have the same birthday, the coincidence is less 
impressive if it involves another person Q instead of ego 
(Falk, 1989). This effect is well predicted by formula (1): 
The burden of determining Q adds to the O-complexity (but 
not to the W-complexity) and unexpectedness is diminished 
by the amount C(Q). This accounts for the fact that first-
hand stories are always preferred (Coates, 2003), since they 
are systematically more unexpected. To show this, we can 
derive the following inequation from (2): 
 U(D1*D2) > U(D1) + U(D2|D1) (5) 
A recursive application of (5) gives: U(Q*e1*e2) = – C(Q) 
+ U(e1|Q) + U(e2|Q&e1). We may consider that 
U(e2|Q&e1) = U(e2|e1), as the most concise description of e2 
for the O-machine only uses e1, whereas the W-machine 
uses neither e1 nor Q. 
 U(Q*e1*e2) > – C(Q) + U(e1|Q) + U(e2|e1) (6)  
If Q is replaced by ego, we get: 
 U(ego*e1*e2) > U(e1|ego) + U(e2|e1) (7) 
This explains why coincidences involving ego are more 
intriguing, as unexpectedness is larger in (7) than in (6). 
Importantly, this “egocentric touch” (Falk, 1989) is obtained 
without any extensional reasoning. The present account 
considers neither alternatives nor “the size of the set to 
which one implicitly relates” (Falk, 1989).  
Equation (7) also explains why a coincidence like the 
double suicide is more surprising to local people. The value 
of U(e1|ego) may be significant, as it would be for a single 
suicide happening in the vicinity, whereas it may be 
negative for people living farther away. 
 
Causality: Griffith and Tennenbaum (2007) developed a 
probabilistic (Bayesian) account of the reason why coinci-
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dences are all the more surprising as they reveal the 
possibility of an alternative hidden causal structure that is 
itself highly unlikely. If the less unlikely causal explanation 
for the double suicide is that the two women influenced 
each other through telepathy, the feeling of coincidence 
remains high. If, however, one can believe that they met and 
decided to commit suicide simultaneously, the coincidence 
fades away. Our model accounts for the phenomenon, 
without relying on the notion of probability. Suppose that 
some causal explanation H accounts for both e1 and e2. This 
means that Cw(e1|H) and Cw(e2|H) are negligible. If e1 and e2 
are explained by H, then: 
 Cw(e1*e2) < Cw(H*e1*e2)  Cw(H) (8) 
The W-complexity Cw(H) of a causal explanation H is the 
amount of information required for the „world‟ W to gener-
ate H. It measures the credibility of the theory (Chaitin, 
2004). If H is easy to believe, U(e1*e2) does not take 
significant values and there is no reason to be surprised. 
Conversely, if H is hard to accept, as for the telepathy 
hypothesis,
2
 then Cw(H) takes high, prohibitive, values. The 
sequence H*e1*e2 no longer provides the lowest value for 
Cw(e1*e2) and the hypothesis should be rejected. 
Discussion: What the model predicts 
The perception of coincidences is a definite ability, like the 
ability to decide whether a sentence in one‟s mother lan-
guage is grammatical or not. Individuals know when a state 
of affairs makes a good coincidence, and they know if some 
variation of a given parameter makes a difference. This 
cognitive ability has to be accounted for, and this is what is 
attempted here. 
The model proposed in this paper meets all the 
specifications concerning the perception of coincidences 
that have been listed above, by explaining the systematic 
role of analogy, of association, of prominence, of round 
numbers, of closeness, of remoteness, of egocentricity and 
of causality. Probabilistic models at best predict certain of 
these features, while the others remain mysterious. The 
model derived from formula (1) succeeds in predicting them 
all. Moreover, it does it in a quantitative way. For instance, 
the effect of spatial closeness is expected to obey a 
logarithmic law 2log2 d, and time will affect coincidence 
logarithmically as well. In the case of fortuitous encounters, 
the complexity (= shortest description) of the place is 
predicted to be the determining factor, not distance. These 
various dependencies are all testable and thus make the 
model falsifiable. 
A classical critique addressed to complexity-based 
approaches is that Kolmogorov complexity is proven to be 
uncomputable (Li & Vitányi, 1993). Models based on 
Kolmogorov complexity are thus sometimes believed to 
                                                          
2 One way to estimate the W-complexity of the telepathy 
hypothesis is to imagine the complexity of the conditions that led 
to an effect in this situation and to the absence of effect in other 
situations. 
lack any real predictive power. This led authors (Simon, 
1972; Feldman, 2004) to consider alternative measures of 
complexity, such as Boolean complexity or algebraic 
complexity, that are computable. Indubitably, human minds 
are not ideal computing device that would be free to run any 
kind of program. Minds are bound to process signals and 
representations in certain particular ways. However, they are 
sensitive to the complexity of their own processes, as shown 
for instance by the existence of strong perceptive biases 
toward simplicity (Chater, 1999; Chater & Vitányi, 2003). 
The law encapsulated in formula (1) suggests that this 
preference for simplicity operates at higher levels of 
abstraction as well, and across various modalities. 
Unexpectedness conflates all available sources of complex-
ity (perceptual, structural, spatio-temporal, conceptual) into 
one single measure that constitutes the judgment of 
coincidence. This is why the analogy with Kolmogorov 
complexity is justified, as the only absolute criterion is the 
size of the shortest available description. 
One can legitimately worry about the existence of two 
types of models that address the issue of coincidence 
perception. If the complexity-based model proposed here is 
correct, why would probabilistic or Bayesian accounts have 
partial predictive power? And why are coincidences 
systematically accompanied by a subjective feeling of low 
probability (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007)? The relation 
between descriptive complexity and probability has always 
been noticed (Solomonoff, 1997), but its usual formulation 
as p = 2
–C(D)
 is unsatisfactory for our purpose. It would mean 
that the probability of structures is a decreasing function of 
their complexity, but coincidences are often striking just 
because they are simple. To account for the subjective 
perception of probability in case of lottery results, we 
introduced an alternative way of deriving probability from 
complexity (Dessalles, 2006), by defining cognitive 
probability as: 
 p = 2
–U
 (9) 
Cognitive probability is defined only for unexpected 
situations, which means that U > 0. This definition reverses 
Shannon‟s definition, where unexpectedness plays the role 
of information. It suggests that unexpectedness, as defined 
by (1), is a more fundamental cognitive notion from which 
cognitive probability is derived. Formula (9) offers a non-
extensional definition of cognitive probability.
3
 It explains 
why individuals do not find that all actual states of the 
world have zero probability, despite the fact that each is 
unique. It also explains why certain features are regarded as 
relevant while others (like the horizontal orientation of dice) 
are spontaneously discarded. In the case of coincidences, the 
sensation of low probability appears to result, not from the 
evaluation of a set of alternatives, but from the perception of 
                                                          
3 Checking whether the probabilities of all elementary 
alternatives sum to 1 would be quite artificial in most cases, as 
situations are rarely perceived as exclusive. 66666 km or 
67426 km on the clock are respectively read as „one repeated digit‟ 
and „any amount‟ and are assigned probability 10–4 and 1. 
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a complexity drop. We do not wonder what the alternatives 
are when we hear that two sixty-year old women chose to 
walk with their most beautiful dress into the sea early in the 
same morning (should they have worn pants, or chosen late 
afternoon?). 
Conclusion 
The research initiated in the recent years on the cognitive 
role of descriptive complexity has already produced 
valuable results. The model presented in this paper is meant 
as a contribution to this enterprise. It should be extended in 
two directions. First, it is important to get a deeper 
understanding of the processes through which human 
subjects assess descriptive complexity and to see how they 
are compatible with the definitions adopted in the present 
model. Second, it will be interesting to confront the various 
predictions of the model with actual reactions of subjects to 
whom various versions of coincidences are presented, as we 
did for probability estimates (Dessalles 2006). Parameters 
can be manipulated according to the model to affect 
surprise. Such studies may prove delicate, however, as 
surprise cannot be easily elicited successively in the same 
subjects. 
One important conclusion strongly suggested by the 
model is that the human mind is able to perform non-trivial 
formal computations. The sensitivity to complexity drop 
seems to be a general law, which applies across modalities 
and at all levels of abstraction. This means that our mind is 
able, in some way, to assess the complexity of its own 
information processing. Such a possibility opens many new 
perspectives. 
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